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Abstract
The human brain is tightly coupled to the world through its sensory-motor systems—but it also
spends a lot of its metabolism talking to itself. One important function of this intrinsic activity is
the establishment and updating of event models—representations of the current situation that can
predictively guide perception, learning, and action control. Here, we propose that event models
largely depend on the default network (DN) midline core that includes the posterior cingulate and
anterior medial prefrontal cortex. An increasing body of data indeed suggests that this subnetwork
can facilitate stimuli processing during both naturalistic event comprehension and cognitive tasks
in which mental representations of prior situations, trials, and task rules can predictively guide
attention and performance. This midline core involvement in supporting predictions through event
models can make sense of an otherwise complex and conflicting pattern of results regarding the
possible cognitive functions subserved by the DN.
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1. Introduction
How does the brain place itself in a position to deal with the twists and turns of com-
plex situations? One possibility is that it builds generative models of current situations
and then uses these representations to drive predictions about what will happen in the
near future. Building and updating such representations is an expensive proposition, but it
can pay off in the form of more effective anticipatory responses, better learning, and
improved ability to use previous experiences to guide current understanding and action
(Richmond & Zacks, 2017).
In this paper, we will make a speculative proposal about how the brain operates to
build models of ongoing situations, which is based in large measure on new results from
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies measuring resting state functional
connectivity (Fox & Raichle, 2007), stimuli-locked correlations (Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhr-
mann, & Malach, 2004), and multivariate pattern analyses (Norman, Polyn, Detre, &
Haxby, 2006). We will ultimately propose that the midline default network (DN) core
actively and continuously builds models of the immediate situation that enable prediction
and interpretation. To do so, we will first detail two apparently conflicting views of the
possible cognitive functions subserved by the DN (Sections 2 and 3), and then describe
how the current proposal can reconcile them (Section 4). We will also consider the rela-
tionship of this proposal to related theoretical efforts (Section 5), and how functions may
be differentiated within the midline DN core (Section 6) before summarizing our main
claims in a brief conclusion section (Section 7).
2. Posterior midline DN areas as a locus for self-generated thoughts and internal
attention
The DN is a set of brain regions that include the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the angular gyrus, the lateral temporal cortex, and areas
in the medial temporal lobes, (see Fig. 1). The main features of this network are, first,
that its level of activation as measured with positron emission tomography (PET) or fMRI
generally decreases during cognitive tasks that involve focused attention to external stim-
uli compared to the resting state (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Shulman et al., 1997) and,
second, that the activity of its different constituents fluctuates synchronously during rest
(Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003). Together, these features suggest that the DN
may support cognitive processes that are suspended during task performance. However,
given the unconstrained nature of cognitive activity in the absence of an actual task, there
has been a continuous debate about the possible cognitive functions underpinned by this
network (e.g., Spreng, 2012). Functions proposed to be attributed to the DN have
included the monitoring of interoceptive and exteroceptive perceptions (Gusnard &
Raichle, 2001), self-referential processing (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle,
2001), conceptual semantic processing (Binder et al., 1999), and the free association of
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mental content retrieved from memory to form a “stream of thought” (Andreasen et al.,
1995).
FMRI studies of task activations and functional connectivity parcellate the DN into
several subcomponents (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010;
Yeo et al., 2011). Among these, the functions of the midline core areas, particularly the
PCC, have remained the most elusive. The PCC has one of the highest basal energy con-
sumption levels of the brain (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Leech & Sharp, 2014) and is
characterized by a dynamic pattern of functional connectivity with a wide array of corti-
cal areas. The PCC is highly connected to other regions within the DN, forming a mid-
line core subsystem with the mPFC where both regions act as major cortical hubs that
integrate information across the network (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Buckner et al.,
2009; see Fig. 2 for an anatomical delineation of these two regions). In addition, recent
studies have revealed that the PCC also shows transient periods of cross-network interac-
tions with a number of other brain regions (Kabbara, Falou, Khalil, Wendling, & Hassan,
2017; de Pasquale, Della Penna, Sporns, Romani, & Corbetta, 2016). This has led to the
proposal that the PCC not only constitutes a major regional hub within the DN but also
behaves as a connector hub that integrates information originating from most of the brain
(de Pasquale, Corbetta, Betti, & Della Penna, 2018; Leech, Braga, & Sharp, 2012; van
Fig. 1. Illustration of the DN as defined by resting-state functional connectivity and task-based contrast anal-
yses. The yellow border illustrates the DN as defined by the seven-network resting-state parcellation of Yeo
et al. (2011). The red arrows indicate the midline DN core areas; the black arrows indicate DN areas that are
not part of the midline core. The overlaid activations show brain regions that are more activated in the con-
trast of self-reports of mind-wandering versus being fully focused on-task, from Stawarczyk, Majerus,
Maquet, et al. (2011). The dark blue activations are thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected for multiple compar-
isons. The teal activations are thresholded at p < .05 family-wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple compar-
isons over the DN mask. PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; MTL, medial
temporal lobe; AG, angular gyrus; LTC, lateral temporal cortex. Activations are displayed on an inflated sur-
face map (population average landmark surface: PALS-B12) using CARET software (Van Essen, 2005).
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den Heuvel & Sporns, 2013). These features likely explain why the PCC is associated
with a variety of cognitive tasks in the spatial, motivational, social, and memory domains
(e.g., Bzdok et al., 2015; Leech & Sharp, 2014; Pearson, Heilbronner, Barack, Hayden, &
Platt, 2011).
Regarding the possible functions of the midline DN core, one dominant view is that,
through their interaction with other DN areas, the PCC and mPFC mainly support self-
generated thoughts that are decoupled from the here and now (Andrews-Hanna, Small-
wood, & Spreng, 2014; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, &
Andrews-Hanna, 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). Given the limited nature of attentional
resources, it has been proposed that the suppression of self-generated thoughts and inter-
nal mentation is required for optimal performance during demanding tasks that require
the continuous processing of external stimuli (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). During such
tasks, higher activity in the PCC has been associated with impaired performance (Weiss-
man, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006), and activity in the midline DN core has been
associated with self-reports of mind-wandering episodes (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood,
Schooler, & Smith, 2009; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011; see
Fig. 1). In addition, fMRI studies using functional connectivity analyses have shown that
Fig. 2. Anatomy of the midline DN core based on Brodmann cytoarchitecture. Panel (a) illustrates the
approximate location of the mPFC, which is often described as primarily comprising areas 32, 24, and 25
(Corcoles-Parada et al., 2017). However, recent parcellations of the DN consider that the mPFC can be subdi-
vided into three parts (dmPFC, mPFC, and vmPFC) with only the mPFC being part of the DN midline core.
The dmPFC is more strongly associated with regions involved in mentalizing and social cognition, while the
vmPFC is more closely related to limbic and subcortical areas supporting motivational and valuation pro-
cesses (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; D’Argembeau, 2013; Yeo et al., 2011). Areas 12 and 14 are not repre-
sented as they were not explicitly defined in humans by Brodmann (1909). Panel (b) illustrates the
approximate location of the PCC, which was initially considered as consisting of areas 23, 29, 30, and 31
(Brodmann, 1909). However, more recent views consider that the PCC only includes the posterior parts of
areas 23 and 31 (Leech & Sharp, 2014; Vogt, 2009) with areas 29 and 30 being parts of the Rsp. Area 7 is
usually referred to as the Precuneus, while areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 are parts of the sensory-motor system. dmPFC,
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventral medial prefrontal cortex;
PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; Rsp, retrosplenial cortex. The Brodmann areas are displayed on the PALS-
B21 inflated surface map using CARET software (Van Essen, 2005).
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activity in the DN at rest is usually anticorrelated with activity in regions involved in pro-
cessing external stimuli (Fox et al., 2005; but see Dixon et al., 2017); this has led to the
proposal of a push–pull relationship between internal mentation and external attention
(Kelly, Uddin, Biswal, Castellanos, & Milham, 2008; Sestieri, Shulman, & Corbetta,
2010, 2017). Finally, recent studies have assessed brain areas on a gradient ranging from
unimodal regions involved in sensory/motor processing to transmodal regions involved in
more abstract processing and showed that the midline DN areas are at the top of this hier-
archy (Margulies et al., 2016; Sepulcre, Sabuncu, Yeo, Liu, & Johnson, 2012). These
findings suggest that these regions are particularly well-suited to processing transmodal
information unrelated to immediate sensory input. Such a claim is widely supported by
meta-analyses of fMRI studies that show large overlaps in midline DN activations across
a range of tasks requiring internally focused mentation based on long-term memory repre-
sentations; these include autobiographical memory, self-projection in the future, episodic
memory retrieval, mind-wandering, mentalizing, semantic cognition, and personal goal
processing (Benoit & Schacter, 2015; Binder et al., 1999; Kim, 2012, 2016; Spreng, Mar,
& Kim, 2009; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015).
In sum, task-based and functional connectivity fMRI studies have led researchers to
the view that the midline DN core specializes in self-generated, offline representations
and stands in a push-pull relationship with other systems that focus on processing the cur-
rent external world (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Dixon, Fox, & Christoff,
2014; Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007).
3. The midline DN can guide the processing of external stimuli by maintaining
previously constructed representations
The conceptualization of the DN as a system that focuses inward and trades off control
with systems focused on the outside world may be the dominant one in current theorizing
—but it is not the only view. An alternative proposal holds that the midline DN can play
crucial roles in the processing of external stimuli by combining new information with
previously constructed representations. Evidence for this view comes from studies in
which stimulus processing depends upon integrating current visual information with infor-
mation in memory. For example, in a variant of the n-back task that did not require mem-
ory updating (0-back condition), better performance was associated with reduced activity
in the midline DN core (Smallwood et al., 2013). This finding would appear to support
the push–pull view. However, when participants had to continuously update their mental
representations of the stimuli and maintain them in mind to correctly answer the targets
(1-back condition), better performance was associated with increased DN activity (Mur-
phy et al., 2019; see also Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2015; Spreng et al.,
2014). Complementary results come from a study that showed higher performance when
degraded pictures were preceded by their original versions in an identification task
(Gonzalez-Garcıa, Flounders, Chang, Baria, & He, 2018). Importantly, compared to
degraded pictures that were not preceded by the originals, this effect of prior knowledge
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on performance was reflected at the neural level by (a) higher activity levels in the mid-
line DN core and (b) activity patterns in these regions that were both more distinct from
each other and more similar to those elicited by the original pictures.
In addition, midline DN core activity and connectivity have also been found to be
greater when ongoing performance is guided by a recently acquired rule. In one recent
study (Vatansever, Menon, & Stamatakis, 2017), participants performed a switching task
in which they were instructed to sort cards based on an undisclosed dimension (color,
shape, number, or identity) that they had to discover by trials and errors after each
switch. Activity in the midline DN core was higher following the discovery of the cur-
rently relevant dimension than in the preceding trial-and-error period. Furthermore,
greater functional connectivity between a seed placed in the PCC and primary visual cor-
tex, hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, and amygdala was associated with faster
response times (RTs) but only after the new relevant dimension had been found out. This
suggests that the midline DN core was involved in applying newly learned rules to guide
performance (for other studies involving the PCC and mPFC in maintaining and applying
learned rules in switching and working memory tasks, see Crittenden, Mitchell, & Dun-
can, 2015; Koshino, Minamoto, Yaoi, Osaka, & Osaka, 2014; Smith, Mitchell, & Duncan,
2018).
In sum, in contrast to the view that the midline DN areas exclusively support self-gen-
erated mentation that stands in a push–pull relationship to the processing of external stim-
uli, a body of data suggests the midline DN core might also be involved in maintaining
mental representations of task rules and previously presented stimuli to guide behavior
and facilitate task performance (for a related proposal, see also Margulies & Smallwood,
2017). This suggests that these regions play a key role in integrating internally generated
representations—including information and knowledge retrieved from long-term memory
—with recently acquired information from sensory inputs to guide ongoing processing.
What sort of representation might accomplish this integration? We propose that these rep-
resentations are event models.
4. Event models in naturalistic comprehension
Event models are multimodal representations of events that bring together information
about people and objects, as well as sequences of actions and their consequences in a
spatiotemporal framework (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014). Of particular significance here
are the event models that represent events one is currently participating in, sometimes
referred to as working models, a major function of which is to facilitate prediction-mak-
ing to guide perceptions and behaviors1 (Eisenberg, Zacks, & Flores, 2018; Zacks, Kurby,
Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011). In naturalistic comprehension, the updating of event
models occurs at the transition from one event to the next and is associated with wide-
spread shifts in cortical activity patterns and phasic increases in cortical activity. Such
neural responses to event boundaries occur in a variety of brain regions—including the
PCC—both during movie viewing (Kurby & Zacks, 2018; Zacks et al., 2001; Zacks,
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Speer, Swallow, & Maley, 2010) and reading or listening to narratives (Speer, Zacks, &
Reynolds, 2007; Whitney et al., 2009). In addition, more salient boundaries between
events, indexed by greater segmentation agreement across observers, are associated with
larger phasic increases in hippocampal activity (Ben-Yakov & Henson, 2018). The mag-
nitude of these phasic increases reflects successful encoding on a subsequent memory test
(Ben-Yakov & Dudai, 2011) and correlates with activity pattern shifts in the PCC and
other posterior DN regions (Baldassano et al., 2017). These results are consistent with the
view that PCC and hippocampal interactions serve to integrate recent experiences for epi-
sodic encoding (Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012; for a neurocognitive account of hippocam-
pal activity at event-boundaries, see also Bilkey & Jensen, this volume).
Although the transition between event models involves large cortical responses, partic-
ularly in the PCC, that are accompanied by phasic hippocampal activations, initial data
investigating the involvement of the midline DN core in the construction of events pro-
vided mixed support. In a meta-analysis comparing event model construction in reading
situations to a variety of control conditions (Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & von Cramon,
2008), activity in the PCC and mPFC was upregulated by event model construction.
However, not all findings were consistent with these results. In some studies, PCC activ-
ity decreased, rather than increased, in conditions associated with event model construc-
tion (e.g, Yarkoni, Speer, & Zacks, 2008; see also Zacks & Ferstl, 2015), and event
model construction was also associated with responses in a dorsal mPFC region that is
mostly associated with mentalizing and distinct from the midline core mPFC (see Fig. 2;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). These discrepancies challenge a simple account of building
event models through increased PCC activity.
Stronger evidence for midline DN involvement in the integration and maintenance of
event models comes from studies that scrambled movies or stories at different time
scales, from seconds to minutes, and examined in which areas the fMRI response at a
given time point was disrupted if what came before was scrambled (Hasson, Yang, Valli-
nes, Heeger, & Rubin, 2008). Using this novel technique, Hasson and colleagues showed
in a series of experiments that responses in the midline DN core, and especially the PCC,
depended on what had occurred minutes before, whereas responses in primary auditory
and visual cortex are essentially unaffected by scrambling the preceding inputs (Hasson,
Chen, & Honey, 2015; Hasson et al., 2008; Lerner, Honey, Silbert, & Hasson, 2011). In
a follow-up study, they found that, when listening to intact but not scrambled paragraphs
of narratives, the time course of PCC activity in individual subjects tracked the time
course of other DN nodes in other subjects—in other words, the time courses were simi-
lar across both subjects and regions. Furthermore, the story segments where these correla-
tions were the strongest were also those that were better remembered in a post-listening
memory tests, underscoring the behavioral relevance of this stimulus-locked functional
connectivity of the PCC to event comprehension (Simony et al., 2016). Another study
found that cross–subject correlations in DN regions while viewing the beginning of a 10-
minute movie clip were only present when contextual information was provided before-
hand; this suggests that the midline DN core is involved in the integration of current sen-
sory inputs with past representations to build event models (Chen et al., 2016). Finally,
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these researchers also found that the connectivity pattern of the PCC for scrambled
movies could reach the level of that of the intact movies when the scrambled segments
were presented repeatedly in a fixed order but not when the presentation order was ran-
domly changing with each repetition (Aly, Chen, Turk-Browne, & Hasson, 2018). These
latter findings suggest that, with repeated viewing involving a stable temporal structure,
episodic memory can provide context to guide ongoing processing.
In addition to cross–subject correlational studies, recent studies using representational
similarity analysis to measure the degree to which brain regions represent event-specific
information have also provided strong evidence for the involvement of the PCC in event
models. In two recent studies (Bird, Keidel, Ing, Horner, & Burgess, 2015; Oedekoven,
Keidel, Berens, & Bird, 2017), participants were asked to watch and later remember a
series of short video clips during fMRI scanning. Event-specific memory retrieval was
operationalized as the degree to which the activity pattern in a brain region during retrie-
val of an individual clip was more similar to its pattern during viewing this particular clip
compared to during viewing all the other clips (see Fig. 3 for a more detailed description
of this procedure). Pattern reinstatement was strongest in the PCC. In addition, the degree
of reinstatement predicted the amount of detail that was recalled in a subsequent recall
test a week later, and also predicted self-rated memory vividness (for other fMRI studies
involving the PCC in event-specific representations, see Baldassano et al., 2017; Chen
et al., 2017; Zadbood, Chen, Leong, Norman, & Hasson, 2017). It is worth noting that
stimuli-matched patterns of brain activity within the PCC and DN in these studies were
present even as the activity level in these regions decreased while viewing the videos
when compared to rest (Bird et al., 2015). These findings are congruent with functional
connectivity studies which show that, even when the PCC is deactivated compared to rest
or low demand tasks, it can still show increased functional connectivity with task-relevant
regions (Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016) and that the strength of this connectivity can pre-
dict better task performance (Vatansever, Manktelow, Sahakian, Menon, & Stamatakis,
2018). These findings may help to explain the above-mentioned inconsistencies in PCC
activation level associated with event model construction across reading studies using
general linear modeling rather than representational similarity analysis (Zacks & Ferstl,
2015).
Interestingly, these pattern reinstatements effects in the midline DN core seem to be
largely insensitive to the sensory modalities involved. For instance, a recent study (Zad-
bood et al., 2017) investigated activity patterns in the DN and did so not only when par-
ticipants viewed and then verbally recalled movie scenes (similar to previous studies such
as Bird et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Oedekoven et al., 2017), but also when a second
group of participants who did not see the movies listened to the spoken recall of the first
group. The authors found that the event-specific patterns in the midline DN core observed
in participants who watched the movie scenes were significantly correlated with those of
the na€ıve participants who listened to the descriptions of the scenes. These results suggest
that the mental representations of events in the DN midline core do not depend on the
sensory modalities in which events are perceived and involve processes that are (at least
to some extent) shared across individuals. These results fit well with (a) the above-
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mentioned results of increases in PCC activity at event boundaries that are independent
of the sensory modality of the considered material (e.g., Speer et al., 2007; Zacks et al.,
2001); (b) other fMRI studies showing similar brain responses in the midline DN core
when people are being presented with the same narrative across different modalities (e.g.,
Regev, Honey, Simony, & Hasson, 2013; Tikka, Kauttonen, & Hlushchuk, 2018; Yuan,
Major-Girardin, & Brown, 2018); and (c) behavioral studies showing that the perception
of event structure is quite consistent across modalities (e.g., Huff et al., 2018; Magliano,
Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, & Zacks, 2012).
Is the midline DN core the only candidate for representing event models? In a review
that largely predated pattern-based and resting-state, correlation-based fMRI, Zacks,
Speer, Swallow, Braver, and Reynolds (2007) proposed that the lateral PFC was a strong
candidate for event model maintenance. Localization to the PFC was supported by data
from neurological disease and injury, and early fMRI results suggested that the mPFC
might be specialized for event schemas, whereas the lateral PFC might be specialized for
event models. In contrast to event models, which represent specific situations strongly
anchored in space and time, event schemas are more abstract and semantic representa-
tions composed of the stereotyped knowledge that define well-known situations
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the analytic procedure involved in using representational similarity analy-
sis to measure memory reinstatement from movies. Following preprocessing, brain activity in regions of inter-
est (ROIs) is averaged per voxel over time, resulting in a single brain image representing the overall brain
activity for each individual scene, at both encoding and recall. For instance, illustrated in panel (a) is the
PCC ROI, where pattern reinstatement was the highest in Oedekoven et al. (2017). Next, voxel values in the
ROI for each scene during encoding are correlated with the corresponding voxel values for all the scenes dur-
ing recall. The resulting correlation coefficients can then be converted into a normal distribution (with scores
ranging from 1 to 1) using Fischer’s r to z transformation and plotted in a similarity matrix. Panel (b) illus-
trates a 45 9 45 similarity matrix (based on made-up data suggestive of a strong memory reinstatement), in
which each cell represents a correlation coefficient. Values on the diagonal represent the correlations between
brain activity during encoding and recall of the same scene while non-diagonal values indicate correlations
between different scenes. Event-specific reinstatement scores can then finally be computed, as illustrated in
panel (c), by calculating the differences between the diagonal values indicated in green and non-diagonal val-
ues indicated in red. Event-specific scores that are significantly greater than zero indicate a pattern reinstate-
ment during recall of the brain activity during encoding for the ROI considered. The PCC ROI in panel (a).
is displayed on the PALS-B21 inflated surface map using CARET software (Van Essen, 2005).
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(Baldassano, Hasson, & Norman, 2018; Zacks et al., 2007). However, the subsequent net-
work- and pattern-based analyses have provided extensive support for the involvement of
the midline DN core in event model maintenance, but not the lateral PFC (e.g., Baldas-
sano et al., 2017; Bird et al., 2015; Oedekoven et al., 2017).
In sum, results from studies using naturalistic stimuli show that, rather than specifically
subserving interfering self-generated thoughts, activity in the midline DN core likely
reflects the integration of incoming sensory information with prior memory representa-
tions to create and maintain coarse event models over relatively extended time scales
(e.g., Chen et al., 2016). A major purpose of such event models is to guide the interpreta-
tion of novel information. Because they form stable representations of a current event,
they also form a basis for subsequent memory. When a specific previously experienced
event is retrieved on the basis of external cues (as in the above-mentioned memory tasks
for naturalistic stimuli), a new event model is constructed that tends to be similar to the
one that was formed during the encoding experience. These findings fit well with those
reviewed in the previous section—primarily that the midline DN core is involved in (re)
implementing switching task rules to guide ongoing performance (for a related proposal,
see Smith et al., 2018). However, a major difference between comprehending naturalistic
events and most laboratory tasks is that naturalistic activities allow one to bring rich prior
knowledge to bear, whereas most laboratory tasks are arbitrary by design. Therefore, sev-
eral repetitions are probably required to build event models from the regularities of labo-
ratory tasks that do not match everyday situations, as shown in Aly et al. (2018) in their
study involving repeated presentations of scrambled movies. In the next section, we dis-
cuss the processes by which people learn such regularities and relate them to the domi-
nant view, which links the activity of the DN and PCC to self-generated thoughts and
internal mentation.
5. Behavioral guidance and self-generated thoughts
The view that the DN supports combining current information with internally gener-
ated representations fits with long-standing proposals that this network may be specialized
for predictive processing. Such claims were initially made to explain the brain’s high
energy consumption at rest, suggesting that the brain can be considered as a Bayesian
inference engine (e.g., Raichle, 2006; Raichle & Gusnard, 2005; see also Clark, 2013;
Hohwy, 2012). A major function of the brain, and particularly the DN, would be to com-
bine external and internal information to update representations of prior knowledge based
on stable environmental information; these updated representations would then be used to
interpret sensory inputs and guide future behaviors (for a computational account of this
proposal using Markov decision processes, see Dohmatob, Dumas, & Bzdok, 2017; see
also Pearson et al., 2011). Our proposal is similar to these accounts and suggests that the
midline DN is involved in integrating information to guide behavior at the highest level
of representation (i.e., event models) over time scales of seconds to minutes, and that
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such processing operates during both cognitive tasks and during naturalistic perception
and action.2
Among the theoretical predictive brain accounts, the proposal that the DN supports
prediction through the construction of event models is particularly close to the proactive
brain proposal of Moshe Bar (2007, 2009) and the situated conceptualization model of
Barsalou (2003, 2009, 2016). Bar’s proposal is mainly based on the findings that the per-
ception of objects that are strongly associated with specific contexts is associated with
widespread activity within the midline DN core and parahippocampal cortex compared to
objects that are not tied to any particular context (e.g., a toothbrush versus a Rubik’s
Cube; Bar, 2004). Briefly summarized, Bar proposed that this widespread DN activation
corresponds to the activation of contextual information stored in memory that is associ-
ated with the perceived object (e.g., for a toothbrush it could be a sink, teeth, toothpaste,
etc.). The purpose of this widespread activation would be to form predictions which
would then facilitate perception and behavior. Although mostly based on object recogni-
tion experiments, Bar suggested that his model also applies to naturalistic situations and
proposed that complex inputs can trigger multiple contextual association processes in par-
allel to generate compound predictions (Bar, 2009; see also Livne & Bar, 2016). Our pro-
posal agrees with this statement, and we suggest that these compound predictions likely
correspond to event models that are supported by the PCC and mPFC.
Similar to Bar’s proactive brain proposal, a core aspect of the situated conceptualiza-
tion model of Barsalou (2003, 2009, 2016) is that concepts (e.g., BICYCLE) do not exist
in isolation but are instead typically situated in background settings and are associated
with relevant contextual information, resulting in multi-modal representations of inte-
grated situations. In support of this proposal, a recent neuroimaging study notably showed
that the episodic retrieval of previously presented items is associated with the reinstate-
ment in the PCC, precuneus, and angular gyrus of both the activity pattern associated
with the item itself and the context in which the item was experienced (Jonker, Dims-
dale-Zucker, Ritchey, Clarke, & Ranganath, 2018). Barsalou proposes that, when a novel
situation is encountered in daily life, inferences based on sensory inputs activate the most
relevant situated conceptualizations in memory via pattern completion processes (i.e.,
“What is the perceived situation most like?”). The results are expressed in simulations
that, at the highest level of representations, are akin to the concept of working event
models discussed above. Once situated conceptualizations become active in a simulation,
they offer a rich source of predictions about what might occur next. We propose that the
DN—and particularly the PCC—might be the key areas where the linking of incoming
sensory information with situated conceptualizations take place to form stable event mod-
els of the current situation.
The speculative proposal that the midline DN core supports pattern completion infer-
ences based on situated conceptualizations may explain the role of the DN in self-gen-
erated thought. Self-generated thoughts such as mind-wandering (Maillet, Seli, &
Schacter, 2017), as well as spontaneous memories and future thoughts (Berntsen, 2010,
2018) are often involuntarily triggered by environmental cues and are heavily reliant on
the PCC and other DN regions—similar to controlled internal mentation (e.g., Hall
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et al., 2014). Further, it has been proposed that deliberate self-generated thoughts might
represent an evolutionary adaptation in which the reactivation of past knowledge to con-
struct mental representations of events (past, future, hypothetical, counterfactual, etc.)
has become subject to attentional control, rather than being automatically triggered from
environmental contingencies (Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009). We propose here that the
deliberate or involuntary entry of self-generated thoughts into consciousness corresponds
to extreme cases of the same integrative processes by which incoming sensory informa-
tion is associated with memory representations to form event models, the difference
being that the activated representations become the main focus of attention rather than
supporting attention to the external world. A main purpose of this internal cognition
would still be to guide behaviors and allow the making of predictions tough. It has
indeed been proposed that a core function of long-term memory-based cognition, includ-
ing mind-wandering, might be prediction-making (Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske,
2007; Schacter et al., 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, &
D’Argembeau, 2011).
More generally, it is possible that activity in the midline DN core fluctuates between
different states located on a continuum. At one end of this continuum, we propose that
midline DN core activity is the lowest when performing activities where no regularities
can be extracted from the environment and where adequate behaviors rely solely upon
the processing of current sensory information. This state would, for instance, correspond
to the faster RTs with low activity in the midline DN core subsystem during stimulus
classification without memory updating (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2013). Although it is
likely that the integration of current sensory inputs with memory representations to form
event models is still occurring, these event models are not supporting performance to the
behavioral task. At an intermediate level, when performing activities that can benefit from
predictions based on internal representations of recent events, perception and behavior
may rely on midline DN activity to be performed/interpreted accurately. Beneficial
aspects of this situation are illustrated by the above examples of midline DN involvement
in the comprehension of narrative and movies (e.g., Chen et al., 2016), and by instances
of task performance correlating positively with midline DN core activity when responses
to external stimuli can be guided by internal representations of task sets and previous tri-
als (e.g., Kucyi, Hove, Esterman, Hutchison, & Valera, 2017; Murphy et al., 2019; Vatan-
sever et al., 2017). Finally, the highest level of PCC activity would occur when attention
is redirected to internal representations. This redirection of attentional focus can occur
involuntarily, for instance, when memories of past experiences are triggered by perceptual
inputs, or through similar evocation of mind-wandering or future thinking; it can also
occur effortfully when individuals deliberately engage in the retrieval and manipulation
of past event models to answer environmental demands. When occurring during the per-
formance of tasks that require the constant processing of external stimuli and that do not
benefit from memory-based predictions, such internal mentation would be associated with
decreased performance, because their occurrence would likely disrupt attention to the task
at hand (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011;
Weissman et al., 2006).
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Preliminary support for this proposal comes from a study that examined the neural cor-
relates of ongoing conscious experience during the Sustained Attention to Response Task,
a task in which correct responses must constantly be evaluated based on current sensory
inputs (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011). Reporting a complete focus on the
ongoing stimuli was associated with the lowest level of DN activity and highest perfor-
mance. When participants reported that they were thinking about the task (e.g., their per-
formance, its duration, etc.) or when their attention was diverted from the stimuli by
task-unrelated perceptions (e.g., scanner noises, bodily sensations, etc.)—and thus had
their attention relying more strongly on the event model of the current situation—DN
activity was intermediate. Finally, the highest level of DN activity was found when par-
ticipants reported experiencing self-generated thoughts whose content was both decoupled
from the task and the current environment.
Further investigation of this proposal could be made by combining representational
similarity analysis (see Fig. 3) with an experience sampling procedure during externally
directed tasks in which reliance on internal representations can be harmful to performance
(e.g., Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2014). If PCC activity when participants
report being fully focused on-task supports the event model of the currently perceived sit-
uation, then activity patterns in this region should be highly similar across the different
on-task reports, both within and across participants, as in all these cases attention is
focused on the exact same task. However, when participants are experiencing mind-wan-
dering, attention becomes focused internally and the event model of the ongoing situation
becomes hijacked by idiosyncratic information from long-term memory. In situations such
as these, unless all participants are continuously thinking about the exact same thing
whenever they report experiencing mind-wandering, patterns of activity in the PCC
should be dissimilar across mind-wandering reports, again both between and within par-
ticipants. Another possibility would be to examine activity pattern in populations with
impaired event comprehension (e.g., Alzeihmer disease patients; Bailey, Kurby, Giovan-
netti, & Zacks, 2013) and to examine whether disrupted neural activity patterns in the
midline DN core during tasks involving naturalistic stimuli can be predicted by difficul-
ties in event comprehension.
6. A gradient of abstraction within midline structures
As mentioned earlier, the PCC and the mPFC are both core nodes in the DN
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) and are commonly activated in many situations. However,
their functions are by no means identical. For example, both the PCC and mPFC are
recruited for self-referential processing, but posterior regions are more active in mental
scene construction (Axelrod, Rees, & Bar, 2017). In contrast, the mPFC may process
information at a superordinate/schematic level of knowledge structure that is not tied to
spatiotemporal constraints (Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017). In support of this proposal, a recent
fMRI study (Martial, Stawarczyk, & D’Argembeau, 2018) investigated the neural corre-
lates of self-representation in a college student population at the general level (i.e., “in
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general, I am . . .”; self-general condition) or a more temporally and spatially constrained
level (i.e., “at the University, I am . . .”; self-specific condition). They found that both
conditions activated the midline DN core compared to a control task. However, the mPFC
was more activated in the self-general condition, whereas the PCC showed greater activ-
ity in the self-specific condition. These results are congruent with meta-analytic findings
showing that the PCC preferentially processes other-related information and is involved
in contextual information integration, whereas the mPFC is more strongly associated with
self-related and motivational processing (Murray, Debbane, Fox, Bzdok, & Eickhoff,
2015; Murray, Schaer, & Debbane, 2012).
Although the PCC and mPFC may support different cognitive processes, functional cou-
pling between these two regions frequently occurs when new information is integrated with
schematic knowledge. For example, van Kesteren et al. (2010) reported an increase in
PCC-mPFC coupling when viewing a film’s conclusion, suggesting schematic reinstate-
ment. Further, this coupling predicted later recall performance (see also Bonasia et al.,
2018). They proposed that mPFC aids in selectively encoding schema-consistent elements
of experience while suppressing incongruent representations (van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernan-
dez, & Henson, 2012). Consistent with this hypothesis, other studies have demonstrated
that encoding activity in mPFC increases with the degree of schema congruency (e.g., Brod
& Shing, 2018; van Kesteren et al., 2013). In addition, fMRI activity patterns in both the
PCC and mPFC were sensitive to schematic event structure as participants experienced
naturalistic audiovisual sequences that followed familiar scripts (Baldassano et al., 2018).
In sum, whereas the PCC seems more related to the integration of incoming sensory
information with memory representations to form event models, the mPFC seems to pro-
cess information at a superordinate or schematic level that is less reliant upon spatiotem-
poral context. Functional connectivity studies have shown that these regions interact
in situations where incoming information is congruent with these schematic representa-
tions, probably reflecting processes by which schemas help structure the formation of
event models.
7. Conclusion
The midline DN core may be a key resource supporting the establishment and mainte-
nance of working event models, which integrate incoming sensory inputs with past mem-
ory representations into coherent representations of “what is happening now.” According
to our speculative proposal, a major function of event models is to support predictions
about the immediate situation, which facilitates the interpretation of the ongoing activity
and guides future behaviors. Importantly, such integration operates both during naturalis-
tic activities and cognitive tasks, which explains why PCC activity is related to better
performance in tasks where stimuli processing depends on mental representations of prior
trials or known task rules. Self-generated thoughts may represent extreme instances of
this ongoing mechanism, when event model construction is triggered by automatic asso-
ciative retrieval or by deliberate strategic mechanisms and becomes the center of
14 D. Stawarczyk, M. A. Bezdek, J. M. Zacks / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019)
attentional focus rather than supporting attention to the external world. Within the midline
DN subnetwork, the PCC and mPFC are tightly coupled but play slightly differing roles.
They coordinate most strongly when higher-order schematic knowledge—supported pri-
marily by the mPFC—facilitates event model formation supported primarily by the PCC.
Finally, the complex integration process to form event models may go on continuously,
even in states of functional deactivation compared to rest and low-demand tasks. Midline
DN activity level reflects the extent to which attention relies on these models for content
and guidance, which may explain why these regions show the highest basal energy con-
sumption, are major hubs within the DN and, in the case of the PCC, also show dynamic
pattern of functional connectivity characterized by transient periods of positive correla-
tions with other cortical brain networks.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that predictions are probably not the only kind of inferences sup-
ported by event models. For instance, recent studies suggest that they also support
the formation of backward inferences that help to interpret parts of events that are
missed during perception (e.g., Papenmeier, Brockhoff, & Huff, 2019).
2. It should be noted that the predictions based on events models discussed here are
certainly not the only kind of predictions generated by the brain. It is highly proba-
ble that other forms of predictions are generated in parallel at faster (and also per-
haps slower) timescales, including rapid predictive processing in sensory–motor
systems (e.g., Friston, Rosch, Parr, Price, & Bowman, 2017; Kahl & Kopp, 2018).
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